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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law: Miscegenation Laws: The defendants were
convicted under section 798.05 of the Florida statutes, which prohibited
nighttime cohabitation of the same room by a Negro and a white of
different sexes.
On appeal, their conviction was affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court in McLaughlin v. Florida' because it felt bound by the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Pace v. Alabama2 and the
decisions of many state courts upholding similar statutes.3 Both Pace
and McLaughlin involve nearly corresponding statutory schemes. The
Alabama statutes applicable in the Pace decision not only contained a
statute which prohibited fornication by persons of different races, 4
but also a general non-racial fornication statute.' Similarly, the Florida
statutes, aside from prohibiting interracial cohabitation, held adultery
and fornication by people of the same race a crime. 6
Due to the established precedent and the similarities of the two
situations, the Florida court adopted the Pace reasoning that the statute,
although it contained racial classifications, was not discriminatory be-
cause both the Negro and the white received the same punishment.7
Secondly, the court viewed the offense committed by persons of dif-
ferent racial descent as an entirely distinct offense from one committed
by persons of the same race, and one to which the general sections of
the statutes are applicable.8 Therefore, the Florida court found that
both the statutes are necessary in order to enforce the legislative pur-
poses involved.
An entirely opposite reasoning was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in its consideration of the McLaughlin caseY The
reasoning of Pace v. Alabama was overruled and a more realistic test
for determining the validity of a statute containing racial classifications
was substituted. 10 This test, as applied to the cohabitation law, involves
a determination of whether the classifications are necessary and not
merely related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
If the classifications are not necessary, then the statute obviously serves
no other purpose than to draw attention to the racial classification and
is therefore repugnant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 12
1 153 So. 2d I (Fla. 1963).
2 106 U.S. 207 (1883).
3 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 1, at 3.
1 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §360 (1958).
5 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §16 (1958).
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. §798.01 (1941) deals with adultery, §798.02 with lewd and
lascivious behavior, and §798.03 with fornication.
7 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 1, at 2.
s Ibid.
' McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283 (1964).10 Id. at 287.
11 Id. at 290-91.
12 Id. at 288.
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Before this test could be properly applied to the McLaughlin case,
the Court had to determine the legislative purpose which the cohabita-
tion law was intended to enforce. 13 It simply rejected the argument that
the cohabitation statute was intended to enforce its law forbidding inter-
racial marriages'14 merely because it serves the same purpose and is
ancillary to that law.'5
Rather than advancing that legislative purpose, the Court decided
that the purpose of section 798.05 is the same as that of the rest of
chapter 798: namely, the prevention of breaches of the basic concepts
of sexual decency. Further, it reasoned that a situation involving two
different races is no different from one in which the persons are of the
same race, with the general sections of the chapter sufficient to carry
out the legislative purposes in both instances.' 6 Therefore, the cohabita-
tion statutes' racial classifications are unnecessary and violative of the
fourteenth amendment.
The contention advanced by the appellant that Florida's anti-misceg-
enation law barred the defense of common law marriage was also re-
jected.17 While this contention might have been disposed of on pro-
cedural grounds in this case, it did point out the basic issue in the case,
the constitutionality of Florida's established legislative .policy of for-
bidding interracial marriages, which is found in both its constitution
and statutory law. By refusing to consider this contention and by finding
that the legislative purpose of the discriminatory cohabitation law was
the same as that of the other sections of chapter 798, the Court avoided
the fundamental question at issue, other than to cast some doubt on the
constitutionality of the antimiscegenation law. The Court, by limiting
its decision to the question of the constitutionality of the racial clas-
sifications, followed its established policy of resolving cases by the de-
termination of the narrowest constitutional issue necessary to adjudi-
cate the controversy.
While the decision quite properly ensures that everyone in Florida
will be subject to a non-discriminatory fornication law, Florida's legis-
lative purpose of forbidding interracial marriages, which was reflected
in the invalid cohabitation law, is not questioned. The individual's right
to marry remains limited to the right to marry only someone of the
same race, with the legislative policy now enforced by the antimiscegena-
tion law and the general sections of chapter 798.18
This question whether a state can properly have a policy of for-
bidding interracial marriages has never been directly considered by the
13Id. at 289.
14FLA. STAT. ANN. §741.11 (1941) ; also FLA. CONST. art. 16, §24.
15 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 9, at 290.
16 Id. at 289.
'1 Id. at 286; see note 6.
Is Id. at 291.
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United States Supreme Court. In fact, it seems to have carefully avoided
it.
Certiorari was denied to a case in 1954, involving the conviction of
a white and a Negro under an Alabama statute punishing intermarriage,
adultery, and fornication between white and Negro.19 A year later, it
refused to consider a case dealing directly with the validity of Virginia's
antimiscegenation law. That case, Naim v. Naim,20 involved a suit to
annul a marriage between a white person and one of Chinese descent.
Their marriage had been found void under a Virginia statute forbidding
interracial marriages. Racial classification, the Virginia court said, was
necessary to carry out the prevention of interracial marriages, and so
long as this is a proper governmental objective, the classification was
also proper.2 1 In order to obtain more evidence on relevant factors in
the case, the United States Supreme Court sent the case back to Vir-
ginia. When the Virginia Supreme Court refused to send the case back
to the circuit court on the grounds that it lacked the power to do so,
the United States Supreme Court refused to consider the case because
it was devoid of any federal question. As mentioned earlier, neither the
McLaughlin nor the Pace cases deal directly with the basic policy ques-
tion, but only with the problems encountered in enforcing it.
In the McLaughlin case, the Court said that a law using racial clas-
sifications, even to enforce a valid state interest, will be upheld only
if these classifications are necessary for the accomplishment of that
policy. Obviously, this was an application of the reasonable legislative
purpose test which has been used under both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Here it was applied
under the equal protection clause, since the case dealt with racial clas-
sifications.
The validity of the antimiscegenation law itself could also be ques-
tioned under the fourteenth amendment by requiring the showing of a
reasonable legislative purpose for its enactment.2 3 There is serious
doubt that any valid reason could be shown for this type of statute.
In fact, the three basic arguments which are often advanced to support
these statutes; namely,* that the children of these marriages would be
inferior, that social tensions and domestic problems are lessened, and
19Jackson v. Stat, 37 Ala. App. 519, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
20 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E. 2d 749, vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891, motion to recall
denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1955).
21 Naim v. Naim, supra note 20, 87 S.E. 2d at 755.
22Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem,
53 GEO. L. J. 49, 70 (1964), in 14 L. REv. DIGEST 1, 14 (1964).
23 Applebaum, supra note 22, at 68- 70; 14 L. REV. DIGEST at 13 - 14; Cummins
& Kane, Miscegenation, The Constitution and Science, 38 Dicta 24, 32 (1961) ;
Riley, Miscegenation Statutes-A Re-Evaluation of Their Constitutionality in
Light of Changing Social and Political Conditions, 32 So. CALIF. L. REV. 28,
44-48 (1958) ; Note and Comment, 5 Sw. L. J. 452, 459-61 (1951) ; 62 HARV.
L. REv. 307, 308 (1948).
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that psychological hardships to the offspring are avoided, have been
discredited. 24 Therefore the application of a reasonable legislative pur-
pose test would most likely lead to a finding of unconstitutionality
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, espe-
cially since the usual presumption of a valid legislative purpose is not
applied to cases dealing with racial classifications. 21
However, a better approach might be to recognize that the right of
the individual to marry is a fundamental right, protected under the
clear and present danger test.26 Surely it is a right which can be con-
sidered as important to the individual as is his right to own property
or his freedom of speech. The United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.2 7
This test has been applied to the right of the individual to own prop-
erty, mentioned in the first part of the fourteenth amendment.2 8 An-
other right mentioned in this part of the amendment is the right to
liberty, to which the clear and present danger test has also been applied.20
The right to marry has been recognized as being embodied in the con-
cept of liberty under the fourteenth amendment.-3
In Shelly v. Kraemer,1 rights under the first part of the fourteenth
amendment were recognized as personal rights guaranteed to the indi-
vidual. The freedoms of speech and press are also recognized to be of
this character. 32 Where legislation collides with the principles embodied
in both the first and fourteenth amendments, it is proper to apply the
clear and present danger test.33
While admittedly this approach has not been applied in any of the
appeals to the United States Supreme Court to consider the question
of the validity of a legislative policy forbidding interracial marriages,
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the McLaughlin case, in
which he said: "The necessity test which developed to protect free
24 Perez v. Sharp (also known as Perez v. Lippold), 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d
17, 23-26 (1948); Applebaum, supra note 22, at 71-78; 14 L. REv. DIGEST at
15-19; Riley, supra note 23, at 32-40; Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Con-
stitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 CORNELL L. Q. 208, 215-22 (1957);
58 YALE L. J. 472 (1949).25 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 9, at 288; Applebaum, supra note 22, at 83;
14 L. REv. DIGEST at 22; Cummins & Kane, supra note 23, at 43; Anti-Miscege-
nation Laws in The United States, 1 DuxE L. J. 39.26 Applebaum, supra note 22, at 83; 14 L. REv. DIGEST at 22; Riley, supra note
23, at 40-44; Note and Comment, 5 Sw. L. J. 452, 455-457 (1951); Note, 1
STAN. L. REv. 289, 293 (1949) ; 33 MINN. L. REv. 530, 532 (1949).27 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941).
25 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1947).
29 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944).
30 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
31344 U.S. 1, 22 (1947).
32 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
s Perez v. Sharp, supra note 24, 198 P. 2d at 20; see also separate opinion of
Justice Edmonds, id. at 34, referring to the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson
in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1942).
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speech against state infringement should be equally applicable in a case
involving state racial discrimination-prohibition of which lies at the
very heart of the fourteenth amendment,"3 seems to indicate the Court
might well take a favorable reaction to this approach.
C. MICHAEL CONTER
34 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 9, at 291.
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